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Abstract. We define and explore the concept of ideal stabilization. The program
is ideally stabilizing if its every state is legitimate. Ideal stabilization allows the
specification designer to prescribe with arbitrary degree of precision not only the
fault-free program behavior but also its recovery operation. Specifications may
or may not mention all possible states. We identify approaches to designing ideal
stabilization to both kinds of specifications. For the first kind, we state the nec-
essary condition for an ideally stabilizing solution. On the basis of this condition
we prove that there is no ideally stabilizing solution to the leader election prob-
lem. We illustrate the utility of the concept by providing examples of well-known
programs and proving them ideally stabilizing. Specifically, we prove ideal sta-
bilization of the conflict manager, the alternator, the propagation of information
with feedback and the alternating bit protocol.
1 Introduction
A program is self-stabilizing [8, 9, 20] (or just stabilizing) if, regardless of the
initial state, it eventually satisfies its specification. This elegant property enables
the program to recover from transient faults or lack of initialization. During
this stabilization period the program behavior is unpredictable. It is tempting
to attempt to engineer the specification such that the program behavior during
fault-recovery is controlled. For example, the program starts behaving correctly
in no more than ten steps, or critical messages are never lost. However, one of
the features of classic stabilization is that the program does not have to satisfy
the specification for an arbitrary amount of time. That is, the program is free to
ignore the recovery constrains built into the specification.
Another disadvantage of stabilizing programs is their poor compositional
properties. Stabilization programs are usually composed by layers: an lower
level components are not influenced by the higher level components and, after
the lower component starts behaving correctly, they higher level, due to stabi-
lization will eventually behave correctly as well. However, if there is non-trivial
two-way interaction between components, the stabilization or correct operation
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of the composed system is not guaranteed. These shortcomings diminish the
attractiveness of stabilization as a viable fault-tolerance technique.
In this paper we study the class of programs that always satisfy their speci-
fication. We call such programs ideally stabilizing. Related concepts are period-
ically considered by fault-tolerance researchers. However, these approaches are
often regarded as theoretical curiosity with a few isolated examples of no practi-
cal importance. Our thesis is that the opposite is true. Ideal stabilization retains
most of the advantages of classical stabilization while allowing the engineers
and program designers to control the program behavior during fault recovery.
Moreover, since the ideally stabilizing programs always satisfy their specifica-
tion, their composition is similar to conventional program composition. Thus,
the vast array of established program composition techniques can be applied to
ideally stabilizing programs. We are thus hopeful that our approach to stabi-
lization makes the general concept of self-stabilization more attractive to fault-
tolerance practitioners.
Related work. Ideal stabilization is close to snap-stabilization [3, 6] and should
be considered complementary. However, snap-stabilization is defined in terms
of immediate correct satisfaction of external invocations. Such definition may
lead to specifications with sequence-based safety and liveness properties. Prov-
ing stabilization to such specifications often results in operational proofs that
are difficult to verify. Ideal stabilization, on the other hand, does not restrict
specifications in any way.
Adding safety properties to self-stabilizing protocols has been a very active
recent path of research, however most approaches make some restrictions on the
nature or the extent of the faults in order to guarantee a particular kind of safety.
Safe stabilization [12, 2] refers to the fact that few faults hitting the network
should not compromise a particular safety predicate, while preserving global
self-stabilization of the system. Also, the line of work about fault-containing
stabilization [13] may handle only a single transient failure to ensure actual
containment and recovery, and super-stabilizing protocols [10] can withstand
one topology change at a time. When faults are simple enough to be detected by
checksums [16], it is also possible to maintain elaborate safety predicates. Other
approaches included using external entities that enforce safety [11] or make use
of non-corruptible memory [18]. By contrast, ideal stabilization does not restrict
the nature or the extent of the transient faults that can hit the system in any way,
and does not make use of any external entity.
Our contribution. In this paper we study two approaches to ideal stabilization.
The approaches depend on the specification type. Specification itself is ideal if
it allows (i.e. mentions) all possible states. Specification is not ideal otherwise.
Ideal stabilization to specifications that are not ideal hinges on the approach we
call state displacement. The specification implementer provides such mapping
from program states to specification states that none of the possible program
states map to disallowed specification states. We identify the necessary con-
dition for such specifications to allow ideal stabilization and explain how two
well-known programs: conflict manager and the alternator use state displace-
ment to achieve ideal stabilization.
The second approach relies on stating the specification such that all the pos-
sible states are allowed. This allows the engineer to specify precisely what be-
havior, including failure recovery behavior, is expected of the program. Ideally
stabilizing program, by definition, has to follow this specification exactly. We
state a proposition that states that such programs are rather common. As an ex-
ample, we consider the problem specifications for two well-known stabilizing
programs: propagation of information with feedback and alternating-bit proto-
col and provide assertional proofs that the programs ideally stabilize to these
specifications.
2 Model
This section introduces the notation and terms we use in the rest of the paper.
To the person familiar with the literature on self-stabilization, our notation may
look fairly conventional. However, we encourage even the specialists to read
this section as the understanding of the results in the further sections hinges on
the notions defined in this one.
Program. A program consists of a set of N processes. Each process contains a
set of variables. Every variable ranges over a fixed domain of values. Variable
v of process p is denoted v.p. A process state is an assignment of a value from
its domain to each variable of the process. A program state, in turn, is an as-
signment of a value to every variable of each process. The Cartesian product of
the values of all program variables is program state universe. That is, the state
universe defines all states that the program can assume.
Each process also contains a set of actions. An action has the form 〈name〉 :
〈guard〉 −→ 〈command〉. A guard is a predicate over the variables of the
process. A command is a sequence of assignment and branching statements.
An action whose guard is true at some program state is enabled in that state.
The execution of an enabled action changes the values of program variables and
thus transitions the program from one state to another. A program computation
is a maximal sequence of such transitions. By maximality we mean that the
computation is either infinite or it ends in a state where none of the actions are
enabled. Note that we do not assume any fairness of action execution for infinite
computations.
Communication model, extended state. Processes that share variables are neigh-
bors. The communication model determines the type and access method of the
variables shared by neighbor processes. For example, in shared-memory com-
munication model, the process may mention the variables of the neighbor pro-
cesses in its actions. That is, the process may read the state of its neighbor
processes. The extended state of the process is the state of its local variables and
the variables that the process can read.
Problem specifications and program sequence mapping. Problem specifica-
tion prescribes the program behavior. This is done by defining the program in-
puts and outputs through external variables. External variables are thus either
input or output variables. Input variables are modified by the environment while
the program may only read them. The output variables are updated by the pro-
gram, they are used to display the results of the program computation.
The problem specification is the set of sequences of states of external vari-
ables. A program implements the specification. Part of the implementation is the
mapping from the program states to the specification states. This mapping does
not have to be one-to-one. However, we only consider unambiguous programs
where each program state maps to only one specification state.
We make another important assumption about program sequence mappings.
The mappings have to be merge-symmetric. Specifically, let there be a set of
program states pr1 through prk such that they map to specification states s1
through sk. Then, if there is a specification state sm such that the extended
state of each process p in sm is the same as in one of the states s1 through
sk, then there exists a program state prm that maps to sm. In other words, any
specification state formed by extended process state-preserving combination of
other specification states, has a program state that maps to this new specification
state. Most known mappings are merge-symmetric.
Identical mapping maps every program state to the specification state. That
is, the program operates external variables only. Another simple program map-
ping is projection. Each process maintains output variables and internal vari-
ables for computations and record keeping. The projection of program states
onto specification states removes the internal variables. However, the mapping
may not be as straightforward as identical mapping or projection. For example,
the specification requires the output variable of a process be boolean while the
program maintains an integer variable. The mapping is such that the even values
of the integer variable are mapped to true while odd values to false.
Once the mapping between program and specification states is established,
the program computations are mapped to specification sequences as follows.
Each program state is mapped to the corresponding specification state. Then,
stuttering, the consequent identical specification states, is eliminated.
The program does not have to implement all specification sequences. How-
ever, the program cannot select implementation sequences so that it ignores en-
vironment input. Hence the following notion of input completeness. Given a set
of sequences A, a subset B ⊂ A is input-complete if, for every sequence α ∈ A,
there exists a sequence β ∈ B such that: every step s1 of α is also in β and for
every pair of steps s1 and s2 their order in α and β is the same. Informally, the
sequences in an input-complete subset B preserve the results and the order of
the input steps in A.
The state universe of the specification is the Cartesian product of the values
of all the external variables. The state that is present in one of the specification
sequences is allowed by the specification. The state is disallowed otherwise.
The specification is ideal if it allows every state in its state universe; otherwise
the specification is not ideal.
We only consider specifications that are suffix-closed. That is, every suffix
of a specification sequence is also a sequence in this specification. Suffix closure
enables us to discuss the correctness of the program on the basis of its current
state rather than potentially arbitrary long program history. This facilitates as-
sertional reasoning about program correctness.
Predicates, invariants, stabilization. A state predicate is a boolean expression
over program variables. A program state conforms to predicate R, if R evaluates
to true in this state; otherwise, the state violates R. By this definition every state
in the program state universe conforms to predicate true and none conforms to
false.
The predicate defines a set of program states that conform to it. In the sequel
we use the predicate and the set of states it defines interchangeably. Predicate
R is closed in a certain program P, if every state of every computation of P
conforms to R provided that the computation starts in a state conforming to R.
A closed predicate I is an invariant of the program P with respect to spec-
ification S if I has the following property: every computation of P that starts
in a state conforming to I , maps to a sequence that belongs to the specifica-
tion. A program state is legitimate if it conforms to the invariant and illegitimate
otherwise.
Program P satisfies (or solves) specification S , if there exists an invariant I
of P with respect to S such that the mappings of the program computations that
start from I form an input-complete subset of S . That is, the program does not
have to implement all the specification sequences, but it does need to accommo-
date all possible inputs. Specifically, it needs to implement an input-complete
subset of these sequences.
A program P is stabilizing to specification S if every computation that starts
in an arbitrary state of the program sate universe contains a state conforming
to the invariant with respect to S . Therefore, any computation of a stabilizing
program contains a suffix that implements a specification sequence.
Definition 1. A program is ideally stabilizing if every state in its state universe
is legitimate.
That is, true is an invariant of an ideally stabilizing program.
3 State Displacement
3.1 Necessary Condition for Specification
A non-ideal specification disallows certain states in its state universe. Yet, every
state in the program state universe is legitimate. Thus, for a program to ide-
ally stabilize to such specification, the state mapping should be such that the
disallowed states are displaced. That is, none of the states in the program state
universe maps to the disallowed states. However, state displacements may not
be possible for an arbitrary specification. In this section we provide a theorem
that establishes a necessary condition for a specification to be solvable by an
ideally-stabilizing program.
Theorem 1. An ideal stabilization is possible to non-ideal specification only if
the specification contains an input-complete subset of sequences such that in
every disallowed specification state there is at least one process whose extended
state does not occur in any of the specification states of this subset.
Proof: Assume the opposite. There is, a non-ideal specification S that disal-
lows state d and for every input-complete subset C of S and for every process
pi, where i = 1, N , there is a specification state ci in one of the sequences of C
such that the extended state of pi is the same in ci and in d. However, there is a
program P that ideally stabilizes to S .
Since P solves S , P implements an input complete-subset of S . Assume,
without loss of generality, that P implements C. That is, for every sequence of
C there is a computation of P that maps to this sequence. This means that for
each specification state of C, there is a program state of P that maps to it. This
includes the states ci. For each i, let pri be the program state of P that maps to
ci.
Recall that the extended state of each process in d is the same as in one of
the states ci. If this is the case then, according to merge-symmetry of program
mapping, there exists are program state prd that maps to d. Let us consider the
computation of P that starts in prd. This computation contains a state that maps
to a disallowed state, prd itself. That is, this computation maps to a sequence
outside the specification S . This means that d does not conform to an invariant
of P with respect to S . That is, prd is an illegitimate state. However, if P has
an illegitimate state then, contrary to our initial assumption, P does not ideally
stabilize to S . Hence the theorem. 
3.2 Examples
To illustrate the concept of ideal stabilization to non-ideal specifications and the
ramifications of Theorem 1, we provide several examples.
Conflict manager. The specification we consider is a simplified (unfair) variant
of the dining philosophers problem [4, 7] that we call UDP . The program is
adapted from the deterministic conflict manager presented by Gradinariu and
Tixeuil [15]. The processes are arranged in a chain. Every process has a unique
identifier. The specification defines one external output boolean variable in per
process. If the value of in is true, the process may execute the exclusive critical
section of code. The specification defines infinite sequences where in variables
alternate between true and false. The sequences are not necessarily fair as a
certain process may never be given a chance to execute the crucial section. That
is, an input-complete subset of the specification contains any subset of such
sequences.
The specification prohibits concurrent critical section access by neighbor
processes. That is, the specification disallows states where in variables of two
neighbors are true in the same state. Assuming shared memory communication,
the extended state of the process contains the state of its neighbors. Hence, none
of the allowed specification states contain an extended process state where both
the process and one of its neighbors are inside the critical section. The specifi-
cation thus satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1.
The conflict manager program CM is as follows. Each process has a sin-
gle boolean variable access and a single action flip that is always enabled. The
action toggles the value of access.
flip : true −→ access := ¬access
The program mapping is this. For each process p the variable p.in is true
if p.access is true and p has the highest identifier among its neighbors with
access set to true.
Let us discuss why this mapping is merge-symmetric. Any extended pro-
cess state-preserving combination of specification states produces a specifica-
tion state where neighbors are not accessing the critical section. Then, by appro-
priately setting access variables, we can generate the program state that maps
to this specification state.
Let us give an illustration for this reasoning. Assume we have a chain of
four processes with identifiers 〈2, 1, 3, 4〉. The extended state of each process in
this case is its own state plus the state of its left and right neighbors. Consider
two specification states
s1 ≡ 〈true, false, false, false〉
and
s2 ≡ 〈false, false, false, true〉
Some of the program states that map to s1 and s2 are respectively pr1 ≡
〈true, true, false, false〉 and pr2 ≡ 〈false, false, false, true〉.
Specification state s3 ≡ 〈true, false, false, true〉 is formed by merging states
s1 and s2. Note that the extended states of each process in s3 are the same in ei-
ther s1 or s2. For example, the extended state of process p2 is 〈true, false, false〉,
which is the same in s1 and s3. Note that there are a number of program states
that map to s3. For example, pr3 ≡ 〈true, false, false, true〉.
Theorem 2. Program CM ideally stabilizes to the unfair dining philosophers
specification UDP .
Proof: To prove ideal stabilization we need to show that a computation of
CM from an arbitrary program state satisfies UDP . First, we show that every
state of CM maps to an allowed state of UDP . Indeed, among the neighbors
whose access is true, in is set to true only for the process with the highest iden-
tifier. That is, every program state maps to the state of UDP where neighbors
do not access the critical section concurrently. Hence, no program state maps to
a disallowed state.
Moreover in every computation of the program at least one process, the pro-
cess with the largest identifier in the system, alternates between setting access
to true and false. This means that this process alternates between entering and
exiting the CS indefinitely. Such computations satisfy the specification. That is,
CM ideally stabilizes to UDP . 
Leader election. We show a simplified leader election problem LE as an exam-
ple of the specification to which ideally stabilizing solutions do not exist. Again,
the processes form a chain. In this case, we only consider N > 3. In the exter-
nal state, each process has two boolean variables: an input variable contend and
an output variable leader. The value of the input variable contend is set to a
particular value and does not change throughout the specification sequence. In
each specification state leader of at most one process is true. To exclude trivial
solutions, the specification requires that the leader is elected only out of the pro-
cesses that contend for leadership. That is, the processes whose contend vari-
able is true. Each specification sequence is finite and ends with a state where
the leader is elected. Note that the input complete subset of sequences has to
contain a sequence for every combination of the contending processes.
Theorem 3. There does not exist a program that ideally stabilizes to the sim-
plified leader election specification LE .
Proof: Let us consider state s1 where the first process is the only one con-
tending for leadership. This is the process that has to be elected leader. That
is, the following output state has to be in every input-complete subset. s1 ≡
〈true, false, · · · , false, false〉 Similarly, let s2 be the state where the last pro-
cess is the only one contending: s2 ≡ 〈false, false, · · · , false, true〉.
We now form the state s3 where both the first and the forth processes are
contending for leadership and both of them are elected. That is,
s3 ≡ 〈true, false, · · · , false, true〉
This state is disallowed . Yet, the extended state of every process is present in
either s1 or s2. Thus, according to Theorem 1, ideal stabilization is not possible
to LE . 
Linear alternator. For another example, we demonstrate how a well-known
program called the linear alternator LA proposed by Gouda and Haddix [14]
fits into our ideal stabilization model. The alternator provides a solution to the
fair variant of the dining philosophers problem FDP . The problem specification
is the same as described above except all the sequences are fair with respect to
the process critical section access. The modified specification still excludes the
states where two neighbors are executing the critical section concurrently and
the specification still satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1. Therefore, the ideal
solution is still possible for this specification.
The implementation of LA is as follows. Similar to CM manager, each
process has a boolean variable x. This time though we assume that the processes
in the chain are numbered in the increasing order from 1 to N . The numbering
is for presentation purposes only as as each process only need to be aware of
its right and left neighbor. The process actions are as follows. In the actions,
parameter j ranges from 2 to N − 1.
x.p1 = x.p2 −→ x.p1 := ¬x.p1
(x.pj 6= x.pj−1) ∧ (x.pj = x.pj+1) −→ x.pj := ¬x.pj
x.pN−1 6= x.pN −→ x.pN := ¬x.pN
The program to specification states mapping is as follows. For each process
pj , the output variable in.pj evaluates to true if process’ action is enabled.
Theorem 4. ProgramLA ideally stabilizes to the fair dining philosophers spec-
ification FDP.
Proof:
Gouda and Haddix [14] prove that the alternator satisfies the fairness prop-
erties of the dining philosophers specification from an arbitrary program state.
We only show the displacement of disallowed states. Note that an action of a
process p is enabled if x.p is not equal to the left neighbor’s variable and equal
to the right neighbor’s variable. This can only hold for one process in the neigh-
borhood. That is, every program state maps to a specification state where none
of the neighbors are in the critical sections concurrently. In other words, the
program states only map to the allowed states. Hence the theorem. 
4 Stabilizing to Ideal Specifications
4.1 Forming Ideal Specifications
Another method of achieving ideal stabilization is by stating the specification
such that all the states in its universe are legitimate. That is, stating ideal spec-
ification. At first sight this seems difficult to achieve. However, the following
proposition demonstrates that such specifications are rather common.
Proposition 1. For every program there is an ideal specification to which this
program ideally stabilizes.
We provide an informal argument for the validity of this proposition. Con-
sider any program and all the computations produced by this program when it
starts from an arbitrary state of its universe. Now define the specification that
contains exactly these computations. This specification is ideal as all the states
of its state universe are allowed while the program ideally stabilizes to this spec-
ification.
Naturally, this kind of specification may not be very useful as it, in essence,
defines specification to be whatever the program computes. However, below we
describe how a number of stabilizing program published in the literature can be
defined as ideally stabilizing to ideal specifications.
4.2 Examples
Propagation of Information with Feedback. As the first example we describe
a program PIF that ideally stabilizes to the propagation of information with
feedback [5, 19] specification. The presentation of this program as snap-stabilizing
is well-known [3]. The program is presented on rooted trees. However, to sim-
plify the presentation, we describe the operation of this program on a chain.
For ease of exposition we preserve the rooted tree terminology. Similarly to
the alternator, we assume that the processes are numbered from 1 to N from
left to right in the chain. We refer to the leftmost processor, with identifier 1, as
root; the rightmost, with identifier N , as leaf ; and the processes in between as
intermediate. For each process p, the processes to the left of it are ancestors and
to the right — descendants.
Each process has a state variable st. In the intermediate processes, the vari-
able may hold one of the three values: i, rq, rp which stand for idle, requesting
and replying respectively. The root can only be idle or requesting while the leaf
can be either idle or replying.
The objective of the program is to send a signal from the root to the leaf and
in return receive an acknowledgment that matches this signal. Operationally,
the program should ensure that after the root makes a request then every process
propagates this request along the chain from left to right in causally ordered
steps transitioning from idle to requesting. Afterwards, the processes propagate
the reply from right to left in causally ordered steps transitioning from request-
ing to replying.
We define the following state predicates. RP (k) are the specification states
where all k processes on the left are requesting (k = 1, N − 1) and the rest
of the processes are replying. RQ(l,m) are the specification states where all l
processes on the left are requesting (l = 0, N − 1) and all m − l processes
following them are idle (m = l + 1, N) while the remaining processes are
replying. Specification SPIF includes the sequences where the system satisfies
one of the predicates and transitions from one to the other infinitely.
Let us define another pair of predicates. Predicate RP ′(k) defines the states
where k processes on the left are requesting (k = 1, N − 1), the process k + 1
is replying and none of the rest are idle. Notice that RP (k) ⊂ RP ′(k). Pred-
icate RQ′(l,m) are the states where all l processes on the left are requesting
(l = 0, N − 1), all m− 1 following them are idle (m = l+ 1, N) and the state
of the other processes is arbitrary. Similarly, RQ(l,m) ⊂ RQ′(l,m). Specifi-
cation IPIF includes the sequences where the system always satisfies either
RP ′(k) or RQ′(l,m), each sequence has a sequence in SPIF as a suffix and
the transition from RQ′(l,m) is only to RP (k).
We now describe program PIF . It has only external variables. The map-
ping between the program and specification variables is identical. The actions
of PIF are shown in Figure 1.
request : st.p1 = i ∧ st.p2 = i −→ st.p1 := rq
clear : st.p1 = rq ∧ st.p2 = rp −→ st.p1 := i
forward : st.pj−1 = rq ∧ st.pj = i ∧ st.pj+1 = i −→ st.pj := rq
back : st.pj−1 = rq ∧ st.pj = rq ∧ st.pj+1 = rp −→ st.pj := rp
stop : st.pj−1 = i ∧ st.pj 6= i −→ st.pj := i
reflect : st.pN−1 = rq ∧ st.pN = i −→ st.pN := rp
reset : st.pN−1 = i ∧ st.pN = rp −→ st.pN := i
Fig. 1. PIF program actions. Actions request and clear belong to the root process; actions for-
ward, back, and stop – to intermediate processes, i.e parameter j ranges from 2 to N − 1; actions
reflect and reset – to the leaf.
Theorem 5. PIF classically stabilizes to SPIF and ideally stabilizes to IPIF .
Proof: First, we prove that RQ(l,m) ∨RP (k) is an invariant of PIF with
respect to SPIF . Notice that this disjunction is closed inPIF . That is, none of
the actions of PIF violate the predicate. Let us show that a program transitions
from RQ(l,m) to RP (k) and back. If the program satisfies RQ(l,m), at least
one action is enabled. Indeed, if l = 0,m < N , request is enabled in stop is
enabled in process pm+1. If, l < m−1,m ≤ N , request is enabled in pl+1. With
the execution of an action either l or m are incremented. If l = N − 1,m = N ,
reflect is enabled that transitions the program into RP (N − 1). Similarly, if the
system satisfies RP (k) for k = 2, N − 1, action back is enabled. The execution
of this action keeps the system in RP (k) but decrements k. If k = 1, clear
is enabled. Its execution moves the program back in RQ(l,m). That is, the
disjunction of the two predicates is closed and a PIF computation that starts in
a state conforming to one of them, satisfies SPIF . Hence, RQ(l,m)∨RP (k)
is an invariant of SPIF .
Observe that the disjunction of RQ′(l,m) ∨ RP ′(k) contains the program,
as well as specification, state universe. We show that PIF stabilizes to SPIF
from this predicate as required by IPIF . An argument similar to the above
demonstrates that an action is enabled if PIF satisfies RP ′(k). This action
either decrements k or moves the system to RQ′(l,m). Also, similarly, if PIF
satisfies RQ′(l,m), then an action is enabled that increments either l or m.
Moreover, if l = N − 1,m−N , the execution of reflect transitions the system
to RP (k). That is, PIF moves from RP ′(k) to RQ′(l,m) to RP (k). This
means that the program stabilizes to SPIF and ideally stabilizes to IPIF . 
Alternating bit protocol. Alternating bit protocol is an elementary data-link
network protocol. There is a number of classic stabilizing implementations of
the protocol. Refer to Howell et al [17] for an extensive list of citations. There
is also a snap-stabilizing version [6].
The problem is stated as follows. There are two processes: sender — p, and
receiver — q. The processes maintain boolean sequence numbers ns.p and nr.q.
The processes exchange messages over communication channels. The channels
are reliable and their capacity is one. That is, if the channel is empty, the message
is reliably sent. If the channel already contains a message, an attempt to send
another message leads to the loss of the new message. The processes exchange
two types of messages: data and ack. Both carry the sequence numbers.
Specification SABP prescribes infinite sequences of states where there is
exactly one message in the channels. The message carries the sequence number
of the sender. The state transitions are such that p changes the value of ns. This
change is followed by the change of the value in nr that matches the value of
ns.
Specification of IABP is such that for every state in the universe there is a
sequence that starts in it and every sequence contains a sequence of SABP as a
suffix. Specification of IABP is thus ideal.
The program ABP uses only external variables as described by SABP and
IABP. ABP actions are shown in Figure 2. The sender has two actions: next
and timeout. Action next is enabled if there is a message from q in the channel.
The timeout action is enabled if there are no messages in either channel. Upon
receiving a message from q with matching sequence number, p increments the
sequence number and sends the next message. If p times out, it resubmits the
same message. The receiver has a single action. When q, receives a message,
it sends an acknowledgment back to p. If the message bears a sequence num-
ber different from rn, q increments rn signifying the successful receipt of the
message.
Theorem 6. ABP classically stabilizes to SABP and ideally stabilizes to IABP.
next: receive ack(nm) −→
if nm = ns then
ns := ¬ns
send data(ns)
timeout: timeout() −→ send data(ns)
reply: receive data(nm) −→
if nm 6= nr then
nr := nm
send ack(nm)
Fig. 2.ABP actions.
ack(ns) data(ns)
data(ns)
∅
ack(¬ns)
∅
ack(¬ns)
data(¬ns)
ack(ns)data(¬ns)
ns=nr ns≠nrnext
reply
reply timeout
next
reply
timeout
next
reply
next
Fig. 3. ABP state transitions.
Proof: We prove the correctness of the theorem by enumerating the state
transitions of PIF . We classify the state universe of ABP into two groups:
(i) ns is equal to nr and (ii) ns is not equal to nr. The states are further clas-
sified according to the type of messages in the channels. The states and state
transitions are shown in Figure 3. Note that to simplify the diagram we do not
show the states that contain more than a single message. However, after a single
transition, the program moves from one of those states to a state shown in the
figure. The correctness of the theorem claims can be ascertained by examining
the states and transitions shown in the figure. 
5 The Impact of Ideal Stabilization Approach
In this paper we proposed a new way of approaching stabilization. Our approach
eliminates two of the most problematic features of classic stabilization: unpre-
dictable behavior during stabilization and poor composability. We hope that this
work adds more credence to stabilization as a viable fault-tolerance technique
and generates more interest in the subject among both theoretical researches and
reliability engineers.
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